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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this thesis is to document the history of the development of an Assault
Directed Infrared Countermeasures (DIRCM) Program as well as Navy Program Office
(PMA272) efforts to date, to initiate a new start ACAT II Program for Navy and Marine
Corps helicopters starting in Fiscal Year (FY) 2006. It concentrates on the programmatic
aspects of Assault DIRCM and does not go into detail on the design or technical aspects of
the development of the system. This thesis will introduce emerging threats to helicopters
operating in theater and describe the requirement for a DIRCM technology. It will also
highlight program issues based on observations made over the past year as well as provide
a recommended path forward for immediate program execution considering internal and
external program and acquisition constraints both real and perceived.
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PREFACE
The information and technical data contained in this thesis are broadly based on actual
program information pertaining to the Assault DIRCM Program. Historical data are
presented to the best of the author’s knowledge. This thesis is UNCLASSIFIED and all
data presented were accessed via public access in various publications, articles and on the
world-wide-web. This thesis is not and should not be construed as an endorsement for any
company or product. It merely studies current circumstances and provides one option of
several as a means by which to move forward with an Assault DIRCM Program today.
The findings, conclusions and recommendations expressed herein are the sole opinion of
the author and may or may not represent the official position of PMA272, PEO(T), Naval
Air Systems Command or the Department of the United States Navy.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
While addressing the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, Secretary of State
Colin Powell warned that “no threat is more serious to aviation” than man-portable air
defense systems (MANPADS).1 Man portable shoulder-fired infrared (IR) guided
surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) or MANPADS have been the primary cause of combat
losses of helicopters and fixed wing aircraft since the first Gulf War. With the
advancement of more sophisticated IR seekers, as depicted in Figure 1-1, comes the need
for more advanced infrared countermeasures.

The recent urgency is highlighted by irrefutable evidence of the proliferation of
these systems by terrorists and insurgents as they target helicopter operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan. Low altitude helicopter tactics make these platforms particularly vulnerable
to MANPADS as newer generations of IR SAMs are showing improved immunity to
existing onboard flares. The requirement for a Directional Infrared Countermeasures
(DIRCM) system is vital to the survivability of helicopters in today’s Global War on
Terrorism (GWOT). The Department of the Navy (DoN) has recognized that helicopters
currently have a greater need for this protection than tactical fixed wing jets and has
directed funding, to start an Assault DIRCM Program for assault helicopters in Fiscal
Year (FY) 06 with a Tactical DIRCM (TADIRCM), or commonly called, Strike DIRCM
Program start in FY 08.

1

Figure 1-1. Infrared (IR) Missile Generations
Source: PMA272, Electronic Warfare Program Office Road Map Brief, June 2003
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In today’s acquisition environment it is imperative that joint requirements
between the Services (Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps) be considered to the
maximum extent possible for a variety of reasons, but primarily to ensure affordability
and interoperability is considered. Based on the fact that there are a number of
Department of Defense (DoD) programs already in development or production, in 2003,
the Joint Requirements Oversight Committee (JROC), in an executive meeting,
designated the Army as Lead Service for IRCM development for all DoD helicopter
programs.2 Similarly, the Air Force was designated Lead Service for IRCM
development on all DoD large transport fixed wing aircraft and the Navy was designated
Lead Service for Strike or fighter aircraft. It should be noted that this guidance directly
affects any new start program(s) today.

The Program Manager for Advanced Tactical Aircraft Protection Systems
(ATAPS), PMA272, at Naval Air Systems Command is required to execute the Navy’s
Assault DIRCM Program for Navy and Marine Corps helicopters under the Army’s
existing IRCM development effort for Army helicopters. Within the Department of the
Army, the Project Manager Aviation Electronic Systems (PM, AES) manages a family of
programs or a suite of electronic components namely the Suite of Integrated Infrared
Countermeasures (SIIRCM), that address IR, radio frequency (RF), and laser-guided
threats to protect helicopters and aircrew.

As part of SIIRCM, the Army is currently testing the AN/ALQ-212 Advanced
Threat Infrared Countermeasures (ATIRCM)/Common Missile Warning System
3

(CMWS) which provides passive IR guided missile warning and laser countermeasures
and cues flare dispenser countermeasures to defeat current and future missile threats.
The ATIRCM/CMWS Program has experienced a number of technical and programmatic
challenges that make joining the program in the near term difficult for the Navy and
Marine Corps.
This thesis will provide background information on the MANPADS threat
evolution, countermeasures required, and existing programs available today. It will also
discuss program management challenges and constraints that have hindered program
progress and provide several alternative options.

4

2.0 THE THREAT

Man Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS) are small, light-weight missile
launching weapons designed to be fired from an operator on the ground at a target in the
air. They are commonly described as shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles that are short
range surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) that can be carried and fired by a single individual
or carried by several individuals and fired by two people acting as a crew. Depending on
which source is used, there are an estimated 500,000 to 700,000 missiles supporting over
100,000 complete MANPADS systems, many thousands of which are estimated to be
available on the black market making them easily accessible to terrorists and other
insurgent groups. MANPADS are particularly attractive to these groups because they are
inexpensive, highly portable, easily concealable and extremely lethal particularly against
helicopters and other low flying aircraft such as those operating in terminal areas.
According to the Small Arms Survey 2004, Big Issue, Big Problem?, there are at least 13
non-state groups in possession of MANPADS, most of which are considered terrorist
organizations.

MANPADS have been in existence for nearly 40 years but have recently been gaining
attention in world news as terrorist groups are getting more proficient at using them and
as more sophisticated systems are being developed. Most MANPADS weapon systems
consist of a rocket propelled guided missile packaged in a tube, a launching mechanism
and a battery. The tubes, which have an aiming device, protect the missile until it has
been launched and are disposed. Figure 2-1 depicts several examples of MANPADS
being used in the field.
5

Figure 2-1. Examples of MANPADS
Source: Various Sources

MANPADS missiles often use an on-board battery to power electronics of the
weapon for guidance and often a cooling unit to cool the missile’s sensors. Figure 2-2
details the typical components of a MANPADS.

MANPADS systems typically range from about 4 feet to 6 ½ feet in length and about
3 inches in diameter. They normally weigh between 25 and 56 pounds making them very
easy to transport and conceal.

6

Figure 2-2. Main Components of a typical MANPADS
Source: US Dept of State Fact Sheet, The MANPADS Menace

There are three main types of MANPADS generally classified by their guidance
systems or seekers. Most missiles use an infrared (IR) guidance system which seeks a
target by contrasting the heat signature from an aircraft’s engine or hot exhaust gases
with the outside ambient temperature. The vast majority of MANPADS available use
these passive infrared seekers. These missiles are sometimes called “fire and forget”
missiles because the operator doesn’t have to guide the missile to its target. It merely
flies to the hottest source in its path. A second commonly employed method uses
operator guidance commands relayed to the missile via radio signal, somewhat similar to
radio controlled airplanes. This design requires the operator to visually aim at the target
and manually guide the missile. The former method is more common and a since it
doesn’t emit energy from the launcher, is very difficult to detect and evade. As these
operators become more proficient however, the latter method may become more
7

detrimental because the missile can be guided to the target regardless of any
countermeasures employed. The third type of MANPADS available today employs a
laser beam that guides the missile along the laser beam to the precise point that the beam
is aimed.

This requires the operator to continuously track the target by keeping a laser

beam pointed on it.

MANPADS are becoming increasingly sophisticated offering greater range, greater
flexibility, more accuracy in hitting the target and inflict greater damage. Some of the
newer generation MANPADS employ image seekers that lock on to UV or IR targets.
Newer MANPADS can also engage targets at ranges of up to 6000 meters. (Small Arms
Report) The combination of these improvements enables the operator to lock-on target at
greater ranges from greater angles and have a greater chance of hitting aircraft.

The US Military has recognized the increasing threat to its tactical and assault aircraft
particularly from infrared guided missiles. The lethality and proliferation of IR surfaceto-air missiles was demonstrated during the Desert Storm conflict. Both IR SAMs and IR
air-to-air missiles have seekers with improved counter countermeasures (CCM)
capabilities that seriously degrade the effectiveness of current expendable decoys.

MANPADS are the most serious threat to our large, low maneuverable and slow
flying aircraft. Notwithstanding small-arms-fire, MANPADS are also the greatest threat
to US Military helicopters operating in theater.

8

In the past two decades, infrared guided missiles have caused half of the total
aircraft losses in theater. The development and proliferation of advanced infrared-guided
surface-to-air missiles, which have improved lethality and increasing immunity to flares
are driving the requirement of infrared countermeasure systems.

Directional Infrared Countermeasures (DIRCM) are technologies used to protect
aircraft from these advanced infrared-guided missiles. Simply depicted in Figure 2-3, a
DIRCM system confuses the infrared seeker in the nose cone of the missile, forcing it off
course and missing its intended target. An on-board DIRCM system first warns of an
incoming IR missile and then hands off this information to a jammer. The jammer uses
an infrared tracker that follows the incoming missile and guides a laser beam to the IR
seeker in the missile’s nose cone. The system then transmits the appropriate jamming
signals that forces the missile off track.

JAM

MISS

SUSTAIN
BOOST
EJECT

1. MWS: DETECT & DECLARE
2. IR JAMMER: HAND-OFF & SLEW
3. LASER: TRACK & JAM

Figure 2-3. Simplified DIRCM Solution
Source: NGC CH-53E TAP Stakeholder’s Brief, October 2005
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3.0 EXISTING INFRARED COUNTERMEASURES PROGRAMS

There are a number of IR countermeasures systems that are currently in development
or are already in production within the DoD that can potentially be leveraged from as a
joint program for the Assault DIRCM Program.

3.1 ARMY SUITE OF INTEGRATED INFRARED COUNTERMEASURES
A Suite of Integrated Infrared Countermeasures (SIIRCM) includes the Army’s next
generation lamp/laser jammer, coupled with the new missile warning system (MWS), an
advanced flare dispenser, and an advanced flare munition. The suite essentially consists
of the AN/ALQ-212 Advanced Threat Infrared Countermeasures (ATIRCM) (Increment
2) and the AN/AAR-57 Common Missile Warning System (CMWS) (Increment 1) as
depicted in Figure 3-1.

The ATIRCM/CMWS suite design is modular to allow multiple configurations on a
wide range of aircraft and other vehicles. In January 1995, the Army ATIRCM/CMWS
Program became a joint program as the Navy/Air Force Advanced Missile Warning
System Program joined to leverage off of the CMWS part of the program. The lead
platforms were to be the MH-60K helicopter for the Army, the AV-8B jet aircraft for the
Navy and the F-16 jet aircraft for the Air Force. At its peak as a joint program in 1998,
the total program cost was projected to be $3 billion. Delays and cost increases plagued
the ATIRCM/CMWS program and in 1999, the Army restructured the program to
provide more time and money for serious developmental problems uncovered during
CMWS testing.
10

Figure 3-1. Army ATIRCM/CMWS Components
Source: PM, AES, ATIRCM/CMWS Brief, August 2004

At the time, DoD investigated alternatives but decided to stay with ATIRCM/CMWS
for Army aircraft. However, the Air Force backed out of the program in 1999 shortly
followed by the Navy. After restructuring the program, the Army delayed the low-rate
initial production decision to 2002 and the full rate production decision to 2003. The
system’s overall developmental costs had increased from $54 million to a projected $127
million.3

In addition to reported software challenges, as of April 2001, the Defense Contract
Management Agency (DCMA) was rating hardware issues and the system’s readiness for
production of moderate risk, likely to result in unacceptable or marginal performance.4
11

The ATIRCM/CMWS program has been at risk of total cancellation since 2001. In
Program Budget Decision (PBD) 161, the DoD zeroed the AITRCM/CMWS line in the
Fiscal Year 02 budget. Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul D. Wolfowitz, however,
reinstated funding with Program Decision Memorandum (PDM) 2.5 The Army still
desperately needs improved IRCM protection for its helicopters as was painfully evident
in the loss of aircraft during Operations Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Enduring Freedom
(OEF) in 2003 and 2004.

Following cancellation of the RAH-66 Comanche Helicopter Program in early 2004
the Army has increased funding for survivability improvements for its existing helicopter
fleet.6 In December 2004, as presented to PMA272, the ATIRCM/CMWS Roadmap
showed an ATIRCM Full Rate Production Decision Review (FRPDR) in Fiscal Year 06
as depicted in Figure 3-2.

In March 2005, the Government Accounting Agency (GAO) released an assessment
of selected major weapons programs in Defense Acquisitions.7 In this report the GAO
assessed 54 programs, which represent an investment of over $800 billion, most of which
are costing more and taking longer to develop than planned. The report briefly discussed
ATIRCM/CMWS Program technology maturity, design stability and production maturity.
The GAO and the Army both confirmed in the report that initial operational tests and
evaluation will be completed during Fiscal Year 05 for CMWS and in the Fiscal Year 06
for ATIRCM. The full-rate production decision review (FRPDR) for the complete
system is officially scheduled for 2006 but it rumored to be slipping again.
12
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3.2 LARGE AIRCRAFT DIRECTED INFRARED COUNTERMEASURES
Large Aircraft Directed IR Countermeasures (LAIRCM) is an Air Force managed
program for large tanker and transport aircraft to improve the capability against
MANPADS. LAIRCM is optimized for large aircraft, which present a large IR heat
source (in both surface area and intensity) for incoming missiles. A higher powered laser
and a greater range missile warner is required, which is not suitable for smaller fixed
wing aircraft and helicopters. LAIRCM is currently in production and is planned for the
Air Force C-17, C-130, KC-135, and KC-10 aircraft. LAIRCM is also one of three
candidates being considered by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to protect
airliners from terrorist missiles.

3.3 DIRECTED INFRARED COUNTERMEASURES
The Directed Infrared Countermeasures (DIRCM) system is a variant of the
Northrop Grumman Corporation (NGC) LAIRCM system. ‘DIRCM’ is the term
commonly used for the NGC Nemesis (UK name) variant. Figure 3-3 depicts the family
of NGC infrared countermeasures. In 1989, under Operational Emergency Requirement
(OER) 3/89, the UK Ministry of Defense (MoD) began funding infrared countermeasure
research, with the US Special Operations Command (SOCOM) joining the project in
1993.8 The Army’s ATIRCM/CMWS suite was far from production ready and in March
1999, the NGC DIRCM was selected by the UK MoD and SOCOM for their fixed wing
and helicopter fleets. DIRCM testing began in October 1997 and was completed in
January 2001. SOCOM has now picked DIRCM for the CV-22 aircraft and the MH-53
helicopters.
14

AN/AAQ-24(V) DIRCM Family
Many Names One Product Line
Lamp-Based
Small Nemesis

ViperTM
All Band Laser

Laser-Based
DIRCM / LAIRCM
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PRODUCTION
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Lamp-Based
Large Nemesis

DEVELOPMENT

MIMS Advanced Guardian
2-Color IR- System
Pointer
MWS Processor Tracker

Guardian System

US calls this DIRCM

Figure 3-3. NGC Family of DIRCMs
Source: Northrop Grumman Corporation

3.4 TACTICAL AIRCRAFT DIRECTED INFRARED COUNTERMEASURES
The US Navy’s Tactical Aircraft Directed Infrared Countermeasures (TADIRCM)
program is researching the feasibility of a deployable IR laser countermeasures capability
aboard tactical fixed wing aircraft. TADIRCM is an Advanced Technology (ATD)
program directed by the Naval Research Laboratory (NRL). It is a low profile, laserbased infrared (IR) countermeasure system designed to protect fixed wing aircraft from
both today’s and tomorrow’s surface to air and air-to-air IR guided missile threats.
TADIRCM consists of an infrared missile warning system (MWS) and a directed
countermeasure system (DIRCM) intended to be operationally deployed on tactical jet
aircraft, specifically the Navy’s F/A-18 E/F Super Hornet.

15

The TADIRCM program is currently a concept demonstration effort managed by
PMA272 at Naval Air Systems Command. The goal of the program is to develop and
demonstrate missile warning, pointing/tracking and directed IR jammer technologies that
can meet the needs of tactical fixed wing aircraft. Requirements for tactical jet aircraft
exceed the requirements for helicopters primarily because of the different operating
environments to which they deploy. One such example is a considerably smaller, more
aerodynamic jam head for the laser jammer needs to be utilized, much smaller than the
ATIRCM or DIRCM jam heads intended for helicopters and large transports. Another
example is TADIRCM requires an IR staring sensor that has a longer range and better
clutter rejection and operates at different wavelengths to minimize false alarms.
TADIRCM is being developed as a podded system.

An Early Operational Assessment (EOA) is currently underway to further
advance the technology and act as a risk reduction effort. TADIRCM will result in a
Strike DIRCM Program currently budgeted as a Fiscal Year 08 program start.

3.5 ASSAULT DIRECTED INFRARED COUNTERMEASURES
Following JROC guidance, the Navy submitted a budget proposal for Assault
DIRCM based on joining the Army’s ATIRCM Program. In 2004, the Navy received FY
06 funding for a new start ACAT II Program namely an ATIRCM Increment 3 based on
the notional evolutionary acquisition roadmap depicted in Figure 3-4. It should be noted
that this figure is identical to Figure 3-2 with Increment 3 highlighted as being a Navy-
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Figure 3-4. ATIRCM/CMWS Increment 3.
Source: PMA272 and PM, AES Joint Brief, October 2004

led increment. Navy would develop Increment 3 satisfying the Army requirements as
well.
The program was to be cooperative with the Army leading the spiral development but
the Navy would have the technical lead of Navy unique requirements. The Milestone
Decision Authority would be the Army Acquisition Executive; CommunicationsElectronics Command (CECOM) would be the Procuring Contracting Officer (PCO) and
the Navy would be the Contracting Officer Representative (COR) for Navy unique
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contract efforts. The contract would be Cost Plus Incentive Fee, sole source to BAE. Per
the approved Army Acquisition Strategy already in place, BAE would compete
component upgrades as directed.

Considering capability requirements (future threats) annotated in the draft
Capabilities Definition Document (CDD) and with Navy legacy aircraft and different
existing systems, there was only one common component available in Increment 2 that
the Navy could feasibly leverage from. The Circuit Card Assembly (CCA) was the only
common funding requirement that was to be developed. All other components would
have to be developed to accommodate current Navy aircraft configurations and future
capabilities requirements. A notional developmental Non-Recurring Engineering (NRE)
component diagram is depicted in Figure 3-5.

The Navy worked with Army to comply with JROC guidance as a cooperative
program for ATIRCM Increment 3. A concurrent Army Increment 2 Full Rate
Production Decision Review (FRPDR) with a Navy led Increment 3 Milestone B was
planned with the Army Acquisition Executive staff. A Memorandum of Agreement
(MOA) and a Charter between PMA272 and PM, AES was drafted and the Navy
Requirements Officer, N-78, drafted a CDD with the Army in 2004.
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Figure 3-5. Notional Increment 3 Development NRE
Source: PMA272

In August 2004, progress between PM, AES (the Army ATIRCM PM) and PMA272
slowed. The CDD, MOA and Charter remained in a draft status and a Joint Acquisition
Strategy had yet to be worked. The PM, AES cited technical problems with
ATIRCM/CMWS testing as well as a lack of resources as the cause for the inability to
work Increment 3 with the Navy. Rightfully so, the Army had current problems that
needed immediate attention and focus. Army said a delay of at least until June 05 was
inevitable. This meant at least a six-month delay for the Navy effort. As of November 1,
2005, no progress has been made to propel a joint ATIRCM/CMWS Increment 3.
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3.6 CH-53E TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT PROJECT
FY 05 Supplemental funding was received in July 2005 to provide for the
procurement and testing of a Directed Infrared Countermeasures (DIRCM) for the CH53E Helicopter, proven capability currently employed on SOCOM’s MH-53J. PMA261,
the H-53 Heavy Lift Helicopter Program Office, requested assistance from PMA272 in
the execution of this effort. PMA272 agreed to execute the effort as a Technology
Assessment Project (TAP) to assess the improved survivability of a DIRCM system as
compared with currently installed aircraft survivability equipment (ASE).

A competitive award was given via CECOM’s Rapid Response (R2) Program Office
to Northrop Grumman Corporation (NGC) on September 29, 2005. It is a one-year effort
where the NGC will temporarily install a DIRCM system for evaluation of improved
survivability over the currently installed ASE equipment. This project currently does not
have funding for fleet introduction.
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4.0 ANALYSIS

Limiting the scope of the thesis, keeping it unclassified, protecting DoD information
and protecting contractor proprietary information made it difficult to adequately define
all the issues in this thesis. Program Office resources were used which included the
author’s program briefs, DoD program information, as well as data from four prime
contractor data packages. To ensure information was protected, all information included
herein, was verified via public access venues. Additionally, a literature review was
conducted by both the author and the Patuxent River Technical Library. Selected results
of the literature review are included in the bibliography.
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5.0 DISCUSSION

For a variety of technical reasons, the Navy’s effort at joining the Army’s
ATIRCM/CMWS program has virtually come to a stall. Problems with
ATIRCM/CMWS are well known but how the Army PM will ultimately mitigate these
problems has not been publicized to date. One potential solution prevents the Navy from
spiraling in with the Army development until FY 09, which is unacceptable to the Navy.
It is clearly evident that Navy cannot execute a program in FY 06 with the Army,
therefore other program options have been looked at and a final recommendation is
presented here. Program cost estimates were completed and used to support the final
program recommendation. Due to the proprietary nature of the data, the cost estimates
are not included in this thesis. Estimates were derived based on program office
experience and actual costs from the LAIRCM, ATIRCM/CMWS and TADIRCM
programs were used as well as contractor estimates based on projected sales. Estimates
were based on FY06 dollars and there were no adjustments made for inflation. Team
estimates, engineering and logistics, and test and evaluation costs were rolled up into one
sheet. Representative results of the rolled up estimate for the recommended strategy are
included in Appendix A.

Affordability and total life cycle costs for each option were also developed and used
as a tool to validate the final recommendation. Estimates derived and presented here
have not been validated and a complete cost analysis by cost estimators has not been
done. The results have not been approved by PMA272.
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6.0 CONCLUSIONS

The Department of the Navy 2005 Electronic Warfare Operational Advisory Group
(OAG) listed Assault DIRCM Initial Operational Capability (IOC) as a top priority for
FY08. The Navy has funding and a budget starting in FY06 for an Assault DIRCM
Program. Based on Joint Requirement Oversight Committee (JROC) guidance, the Army
is the designated lead for all DoD helicopter IRCM programs. The Army is experiencing
continual technical and programmatic difficulties on the ATIRCM/CMWS program and
there is a potential for the Full Rate Production Decision Review (FRPDR) to slip to the
right as far as Fiscal Year 09. Bottom line; ATIRCM/CMWS is not production ready and
does not meet the urgent needs of the Navy.

Team estimates have indicated that staying the course with ATIRCM/CMWS will not
only put Navy’s FY 06 and FY 07 funding in jeopardy but will incur excessive
developmental as well as O&S costs and, more significantly, will push the IOC for the
‘lead the fleet’ aircraft out as far as 2015. Additionally, if the Army does not outfit their
entire helicopter fleet with complete ATIRCM systems, procuring ‘big lots’ with the
Army may not present a great savings as once anticipated.

If the DoN wants DIRCM capability on Navy and Marine Corps helicopters in the
near future, ATIRCM/CMWS is not a viable option.

There is only one currently available DIRCM system on the market today that has the
ability to meet the immediate needs of the Navy and the ability to meet future
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requirements such as future IR threats expected to be proliferated beyond 2015. The
NGC DIRCM does not meet all the draft Capabilities Definition Document (CDD)
requirements today but provides the opportunity to incrementally meet those capabilities.
LAIRCM, a direct relative of DIRCM, is planning incremental developments that will
directly benefit DIRCM improvements. Additionally, a number of Navy helicopter
program offices do not support waiting until 2015 for a DIRCM capability and will likely
procure systems on their own if PMA272 doesn’t develop a common system for all DoN
helicopters in the near term. Procuring DIRCM initially as an Off-The-Shelf (OTS)
system and incrementally developing capabilities not only meets the intent of a joint
program (with the Air Force), it increases commonality and thereby reduces overall life
cycle costs to the Navy and Marine Corps platforms.

SOCOM is planning to procure and maintain their DIRCM systems on their fixed
wing and helicopters via the Air Force LAIRCM Program starting in 2007. LAIRCM is
investing millions of dollars to advance DIRCM capabilities that will also be available to
SOCOM aircraft. The Air Force and SOCOM are planning to outfit over 1000 aircraft
with a complete NGC DIRCM system. If Navy joins the Air Force and procures the
DIRCM system, it will benefit from LAIRCM’s technological investments. Additionally,
economy of scale is expected to reduce the costs of a complete system by 40% within the
next 10 years.

In conclusion, considering the current needs of the Navy and Marine Corps Fleet as
well as current technology and life cycle costs, the Navy should consider breaking away
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from the Army and join the Air Force under the LAIRCM program to install NRE
DIRCM systems on our helicopters as depicted in Figure 6-1. This option would allow
Navy to procure and deliver much needed DIRCM technology to assault helicopters now
and it would also provide for future upgrade capability as future threats emerge.
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Figure 6-1. NDI Option for Assault DIRCM
Source: Author
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7.0 RECOMMENDATIONS

The following recommendations are provided based on the author’s observations and
lessons learned while assigned as the Assault DIRCM IPT Lead.
a) First and foremost, it is imperative that program requirements be defined. It is
impossible to formulate a strategy for a system development acquisition program
with moving requirements. Once capability requirements are defined and
approved (CDD approved), then a program manager can expect to develop a
program to meet those requirements.
b) If JROC or DoD direction requires joint participation on a program or assigns a
lead service for a developmental effort, responsibility for that effort needs to be
placed on the lead service. An example of holding the lead service accountable
might be to make joint participation an entrance criteria for a milestone decision.
In other words, as an example, since Navy is designate the lead service for tactical
jet aircraft IRCM development, then the Milestone Decision Authority (MDA)
should ask the question “What have you done to incorporate the other service’s
requirements into the program? Where is the join application on the program?”
If the answer is not adequate, and verifiable, then the MDA should not approve
the Milestone Decision. This would put the onus on the lead service to take the
lead.
c) A total systems engineering approach must be applied to the development of an
Assault DIRCM Program. Currently, there is no design philosophy for common
self-protection systems. Instead of ‘buying boxes’ and acting as an integrator, we
need to apply sound systems engineering processes to include open architecture
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and a total design philosophy so that our systems are compatible on all of our
aircraft as well as compatible with each other.
d) Initially, when efforts were underway to work on a spiral upgrade to the
ATIRCM/CMWS Program, a developmental Non-Recurring Engineering (NRE)
slide was used for all briefings that drove the solution to the problem (Figure 3-5).
By using this slide and this fundamental way of thinking, we were defining the
requirements with existing hardware and driving the solution to undefined
requirements and therefore a particular contractor. A key example is the
assumption on the part of many that 2-color IR sensors are the only answer for a
MWS to counter future threats. If we present functional requirements, we might
very well find that 2-color technology is not the only solution. It is
recommended that a functional design, as depicted in Figure 7-1 be used so as not
to drive the solution to components.
e) DIRCM system sensors for Navy and Marine Corps helicopters should be
designed with an AAR-47 sensor form-fit-factor to the maximum extent possible.
This will enable easy airframe integration and prevent major structural
modification for a new sensor. It will significantly reduce overall cost to the
helicopter platforms.
f) A DIRCM system design should incorporate robust integration with the ALE-47
flare dispensing system. It should not be assumed that DIRCM will be the only
countermeasure installed on the aircraft.
g) And finally, an important consideration when developing a DIRCM system for
Navy Assault Helicopters is Open Architecture. An open architecture is an
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Figure 7-1. Assault DIRCM Functional Architecture
Source: PMA272 Assault DIRCM IPT
h) architecture wherein specifications are public. This allows for the sharing of
functionality to integrate hardware, software and/or operating environments. The
great advantage of open architectures is that anyone can design add-on products
for it. An open standards operating system must be used in all new Navy systems
to ensure future system interoperability and to support software reuse.
Open architecture:
-

accommodates evolving requirements and technology

-

realizes efficiencies as a common operating system

-

reduces and consolidates independent functions of legacy and future
applications
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-

allows for the control of the migration of as-is architecture transitioning to
to-be architecture

-

permits interoperability and net centric warfare and

-

reduces overall cost of developing new operating systems.

There are some factors that need to be considered when applying open
architecture to the development of DIRCM. Commonality, interoperability,
security (anti-tamper requirements), migration of legacy platforms, etc., all must
be considered during the design process.

In order for us to design to open architecture philosophy, we must make several
assumptions. First and foremost, capability definition must be defined and not
changed during the design and implementation phase. It must be assumed that
open architecture design of a DIRCM system will not impact individual aircraft
software. It cannot be proprietary. Existing software is not conducive to open
architecture. And system documentation needs to be thorough and complete and
allow for anyone to use it.
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APPENDIX A

Representative IPT Lead Roll-up Estimate for NDI Option for Assault DIRCM Program

Task

FY06

FY07

FY08

FY09

FY10

FY11

FY12

FY13

FY14

Team Estimate

1,837.25

2,074.00

3,113.50

3,756.50

3,761.50

3,444.50

2,796.00

2,017.25

Engineering & Logistics

3,700.00

25,500.00

56,500.00

22,900.00

5,050.00

3,050.00

1,150.00

100.00

100.00 117,150.00

4,220.00

1,780.00

3,420.00

380.00

800.00

5,537.25

27,574.00

63,833.50

28,436.50

12,231.50

6,874.50

4,746.00

2,117.25

2,082.25 152,502.75

T&E
TOTAL

All estimates are using a FY06 dollar basis (no adjustments for inflation).
Lead platform is an MH-60 Multi-Mission Helicopter.
This option assumes a Navy led program and modification of an existing system.
Includes LW integration w/MW sensor.
Some repackaging of the Jammer is required.
Will use house-keeping software (BIT, Interface control, etc.) with little to no change.
SDD contract award in FY07.
Fabrication and GFE costs include spares quantities for test program.
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24,782.75

10,570.00

Assumptions:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

1,982.25

Total
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